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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s appellate decision
affirming the magistrate court’s order suppressing evidence seized during a
probation search of Santana’s residence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The parties stipulated to the following underlying facts at both the
magistrate and district court levels:
On February 17, 2014 Bryan Santana was charged with
Driving Under the Influence in Canyon County, Case No. CR-20140003893. The public defender was appointed on March 10, 2014.
Mr. Santana entered a guilty plea on April 16, 2014. He was
sentenced on May 29, 2014 by Judge Robert M. Taisey. Judge
Taisey placed Mr. Santana on supervised probation for Driving
Under the Influence for 6 months and for 18 months of
unsupervised probation thereafter. Judge Taisey also gave the
probation officers 30 discretionary jail days. The written judgment
contained the following specific terms of probation:
The defendant shall:
1.
If on supervised probation, immediately report
to the Misdemeanor Probation Dept. [at address/
phone] and comply with all rules and reporting
requirements pursuant to the Canyon County
Misdemeanor Probation Agreement of Supervision,
and pay a monthly cost of supervision fee as set by
the Board of Canyon County Commissioners;
2.
Not refuse evidentiary test for alcohol or drugs
requested by a peace officer, probation officer, or
treatment provider. All tests requested by probation
officer shall be at the Defendant’s expense;
3.
Keep Court informed in writing of defendant’s
mailing address and telephone number.
If on
supervised probation, do not move without first
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obtaining written permission from the probation
officer;
4.

Not commit a felony or misdemeanor;

5.
Not consume alcohol and/or any other mood
altering substance unless prescribed by a physician;
6.
Not operate a motor vehicle upon a roadway
unless validly licensed and insured;
7.
Alcohol monitoring/electronic monitoring/ or
GPS monitoring program at Defendant’s expense, if
required by probation officer;
8.
Within 30 days enroll in and then complete 26
hours of D & A [drug and alcohol] treatment, 20 hours
of cognitive self-change, Victim Impact Panel and 5
hours of motivation group.
The above terms were indicated by checked boxes on a
standard judgment form, except for item 8 above which was
partially hand-written on the judgment form. There is a box on the
judgment form stating “Waive 4th Amendment Search and Seizure
Rights to law enforcement.” The Judgment in Mr. Santana’s cases
did not have that box checked.
Judge Taisey did not orally tell Mr. Santana that his 4th
Amendment Search and Seizure rights were waived.
Judge Taisey did tell Mr. Santana orally: to report to
probation and comply with all their rules, terms and reporting
requirements, that he was not to refuse any evidentiary tests, that
he needed to show up for his “'UA’s” [Urine tests] was to keep the
court informed in writing of his address, was not to commit any new
crimes, was not to consume alcohol or any other mood altering
substance unless it was prescribed, was not to drive unless his
license was valid and he was insured, that the probation officers
may require an electronic monitor or alcohol monitor if they felt it
necessary, that within 30 days he must enroll in and complete 26
hours of drug and alcohol intervention, 20 hours of cognitive selfchanges, and 5 hours of motivation group.
Judge Taisey further said that he was putting Mr. Santana
on supervised probation due to the “nature of the offense,” his “prior
history,” the “amount of intervention being requested,” and stated
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that “the primary purpose [of the 6 months of supervised probation]
is to make sure that you’re actively involved in the treatment
regimen.” On July 7, 2014, out of court, Defendant’s probation
officer required him to sign an Agreement of Supervision. Mr.
Santana did not have an attorney with him at the time he signed the
agreement. He was not told he had a right to have an attorney
present, or to have an attorney review the agreement prior to
signing it. The agreement was a form, this form is the standard
agreement signed by all supervised misdemeanor probationers in
Canyon County.
In pertinent part, the agreement stated: “I hereby agree and
consent to the search of my person, automobile, real property, and
any other property at any time and at any place by any law
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and I do
waive my constitutional right to be free of such searches.”
In Mr. Santana’s case, the standard agreement had
handwritten in, by Crystal Laleman, Mr. Santana’s probation officer,
the terms: “Do not enter any business whose primary source of
revenue is the sale of alcohol” and “No alcohol in the home or in
possession.”
Mr. Santana signed the form agreement and initialed all of
the standard terms, along with the handwritten terms.
On that same date, July 7, 2014, the Defendant signed an
“Admission of Alcohol/Drug Use,” stating that he both used alcohol
and marijuana on or about July 4, 2014. Mr. Santana also signed a
slip stating that he would bring proof of enrollment with “Four
Rivers” to his next appointment. Four Rivers is a business that
offers drug and alcohol treatment. Several days later, On [sic] July
9, 2014, Defendant tested positive for marijuana use.
On July 21, 2014, at around 5:21 PM, Officer Tlucek of the
Nampa Police Department arrived at 224 W. Dewey Ave. in
Nampa, Idaho to assist two probation officers employed by Canyon
County Misdemeanor Probation, Mary Gomez and Crystal
Laleman. Together, they searched the Dewey Ave[.] residence.
Mr. Santana was not present and did not consent at that time to the
search. The search subsequently produced what are alleged to be
various items of drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Mr. Santana
was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia
and possession of marijuana.
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On August 19, 2014 Crystal Laleman filed a Report of
Violation in the Driving Under the Influence case (CR-20140003893). The Report stated that Mr. Santana had violated Courtordered conditions. Among the violations listed were the following:
1)
The defendant failed to show proof of
enrollment, attendance and/or completion of drug and
alcohol treatment as of the date of that writing[.]
2)
The defendant tested positive for marijuana on
July 9, 2014 (and attached test results).
3)
The defendant admitted the use of alcohol and
marijuana on or about July 4, 2014 (and attached Mr.
Santana’s admission).
4)
That on July 2, 2014, the defendant was
charged with a battery (CR-14-0015343).
(R., pp.122-126.)
The state charged Santana with two misdemeanors based on the search
of his residence – possession of marijuana and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.7-8.) Santana filed a motion to suppress evidence. (R.,
pp.23-35.) In lieu of presenting live testimony, the parties stipulated to the facts
as set forth above, and submitted briefs on the issue. (R., pp.23-35, 47-70, 122126; 6/18/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-12.)

At a hearing to announce its decision, the

magistrate court granted Santana’s motion to suppress the evidence. (R., pp.7475; see generally 6/18/15 Tr.)
The state appealed to the district court, which, upon the submission of
briefs by the parties (R., pp.71-73, 79-112), affirmed the magistrate court’s
suppression order (R., pp.128-135). The state timely appeals the district court’s
order suppressing the evidence. (R., pp.136-139.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting Santana’s motion to suppress
evidence which was lawfully seized during a probation home visit?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s Order Granting Santana’s
Motion To Suppress Evidence Because The Evidence Was Lawfully Seized
A.

Introduction
The magistrate court suppressed marijuana and drug paraphernalia

seized from Santana’s residence during a search conducted by two probation
officers and a Nampa Police Officer. The district court affirmed the magistrate
court’s determination that the search of Santana’s residence was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, ruling: (1) Santana’s Fourth Amendment waiver
(i.e., “consent”) in the Agreement of Supervision was invalid because the
magistrate court did not order or endorse it as a condition of probation, and (2) as
a non-consensual probation search, the search of Santana’s residence was
invalid because, even if there was a “reasonable suspicion” evidence of a
probation violation would be found, there were no “exigent circumstances” to
justify the search without obtaining a warrant. 1
The district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s suppression order
because (1)(a) the trial court’s probation order contemplated that Santana would
be required to cooperate with the “rules” and “terms” of the probation department
not specifically set forth in the court’s sentencing order – such as signing a
Fourth Amendment waiver, and (b) even if the waiver was not authorized by the

1

In addressing the “reasonable suspicion” ground for the probation search, the
magistrate court did not base its decision, as the district court did, on the lack of
“exigent circumstances.” Instead, the magistrate court concluded that Santana’s
admission to smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol, and his subsequent
positive test for the presence of marijuana in his system 12 days before the
search were “too remote to justify a search.” (6/18/15 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.5.)
6

court, Santana freely and voluntarily waived such rights to the probation officer;
and (2) in any event, the search of Santana’s residence was justified because
there was “reasonable suspicion” it contained evidence showing he was in
violation of his probation.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s
decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id.
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[s] the trial
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court]
freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”
State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

The Trial Court’s Probation Order Contemplated That Santana Would Be
Required To Cooperate With The Rules And Terms Of The Probation
Department In Ways Not Specifically Set Forth, Such As Signing A Fourth
Amendment Waiver
The district court concluded that, because Santana’s Fourth Amendment

waiver was made only at the behest of the probation officer, without any

7

involvement of the sentencing court, it was not valid. (R., pp.130-132.) The
district court stated:
The probation department agreement of supervision came
after the terms of the probation were put into place. It had no
authority to impose additional terms or conditions onto the
defendant that the judge did not impose. The magistrate judge
therefore correctly held that there was no validly imposed waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation in this case.
(R., p.132.) The district court’s determination that Santana’s probation officer
obtained Santana’s Fourth Amendment waiver without any authorization by the
magistrate court is incorrect.
First, it should be noted that the magistrate court’s written order does not
say that its list of probation requirements is exclusive, much less that it precludes
a probation officer from having Santana waive his Fourth Amendment rights as a
term of probation.

(R., pp.123-124.)

Instead, the magistrate’s written order

required Santana to “comply with all rules and reporting requirements pursuant to
the Canyon County Misdemeanor Probation Agreement of Supervision” (R.,
p.123) without specifying or limiting what the rules and reporting requirements
are.
In turn, the Canyon County Misdemeanor Probation Department
Agreement of Supervision has ten general terms for probationers to agree to and
sign (initial), the third of which states:
SEARCHES: I hereby agree and consent to the search of
my person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any
time and at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer,
or probation officer and I do waive my constitutional right to be free
of such searches.
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(R., p.42.) Because the magistrate court ordered Santana to comply with “all
rules” pursuant to the Agreement of Supervision, and because one of the
Agreement’s “rules” includes a Fourth Amendment waiver, the waiver was
included as part of the magistrate court’s probation order.
Even if Santana’s execution of a Fourth Amendment waiver is not deemed
a “rule” of the probation department, it is a “term” of probation requested by the
probation department. 2 As such, the magistrate judge embraced it as a condition
of Santana’s probation when, according to the stipulated facts, he “did tell Mr.
Santana orally: to report to probation and comply with all their rules, terms and
reporting requirements.” (R., p.124 (emphasis added).) Inasmuch as one of the
probation department’s “terms” requires probationers to sign a Fourth
Amendment waiver, the magistrate’s verbal order that Santana “comply with all
their . . . terms” authorized his Fourth Amendment waiver as a term of his
probation.
Based on the written and verbal probation orders of the magistrate court,
the district court erred in holding that the Fourth Amendment waiver probationary
term was invalid because it was not contemplated by the magistrate court.
Finally, even if this Court determines that the magistrate court did not
authorize the probation department to require Santana to waive his Fourth
Amendment rights, Santana’s waiver should still be found valid as between he
and the probation department. One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
2

The Stipulated Statement of Facts states, “The agreement was a form, this
form is the standard agreement signed by all supervised misdemeanor
probationers in Canyon County.” (R., p.125.)
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requirement is voluntary consent to a search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222 (1973); State v. Aschinger, 149 Idaho 53, 56, 232 P.2d 831, 834
(Ct. App. 2009).

There is nothing that prevented Santana from voluntarily

consenting to have a probation officer search his residence without court
authorization. Santana has not argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive his Fourth Amendment rights. Assuming he did so only at
the request of the probation officer, it does not alter the voluntariness of such
waiver. Even if this Court finds that the magistrate court did not authorize the
probation department to require Santana’s waiver, it should still be deemed a
valid waiver given by Santana to the probation department.

D.

The Search Of Santana’s Residence Was Justified Because There Was
“Reasonable Suspicion” It Held Evidence Showing He Was In Violation Of
His Probation
The district court also determined that, as a warrantless probation search

without a Fourth Amendment waiver, officers were not only required to have a
“reasonable suspicion” that evidence of a probation violation would be found in
Santana’s residence, but also that there were “exigent circumstances” for not
obtaining a search warrant.

(R., pp.132-134.)

The district court applied an

incorrect legal standard – exigent circumstances are wholly irrelevant to this
case. Moreover, because officers had a reasonable suspicion that evidence of a
probation violation would be found in Santana’s residence, the probation search
was valid.
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
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170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); State v.
Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 716, 132 P.3d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 2006). Thus, when
moving to suppress evidence, the defendant has the threshold burden of
demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed. Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162, 15
P.3d 1167, 1170 (2000); Hanson, 142 Idaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. The test is
whether a defendant seeking suppression had a subjective expectation of privacy
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562,
565, 961 P.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1998). “Since an illegal search violates the
rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or
property searched, only those with such a privacy interest may obtain
suppression of the fruits of the search.” State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780,
963 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1998). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
133-34 (1978); Hanson, 142 Idaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. To show a Fourth
Amendment privacy expectation the defendant must demonstrate both an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy and that such expectation of privacy, when
viewed objectively, was reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231,
1238 (1994).
In State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 590-591, 314 P.3d 639, 645-646 (Ct. App.
2013), the Idaho Court of Appeals further explained:
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy
against governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843 . . . (2006) (“[B]y virtue of their status alone, probationers do
not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”);
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United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 . . . (2001) (“Just as other
punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms,
a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens.”). Thus, a probationer is subject to warrantless searches
by a probation officer if that probation officer has a reasonable
suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S.
at 121–22 . . .; State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240,
242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on suspicion are
reasonable “[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search
condition”). In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496–98, 148 P.3d
1240, 1242–44 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the search
of a probationer based on reasonable suspicion even though there
was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the time of the
search. In State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 799
(Ct. App. 2011), this Court recognized that “well-developed law” in
this area establishes that probation searches may be conducted
without consent when the officers are called to investigate
reasonable suspicion of violation of probation terms. Id.
As the above passage in Ellis makes clear, the district court’s insistence
that “exigent circumstances” must be shown in addition to a “reasonable
suspicion” to justify a warrantless probation search is incorrect. 3 Free review of

3

The district court stated:
Where an individual is already on probation, the standard of
“proximate [sic] cause” to justify a search upon exigent
circumstances is relaxed somewhat, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
[868, 873 (1987)] . . . . The standard is stated to be “reasonable
grounds for suspicion,” – which is a lesser standard – but the
element of exigent circumstances must still be present.

(R., p.133.) However, the only reference to “exigent circumstances” by the
majority opinion in Griffin is in footnote 3, which states in relevant part:
. . . nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be
advised, at the time of the request for search, what the probation
officer’s “reasonable grounds” were, any more than the ordinary
citizen has to be notified of the grounds for “probable cause” or
“exigent circumstances” searches before they may be undertaken.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 n.3.
12

the correct constitutional standard for a probation search – i.e., “reasonable
suspicion” – to the stipulated facts shows the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate court’s suppression order. See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730, 117 P.3d at
144.
As a condition of his probation, which was ordered on May 29, 2014,
Santana was ordered to “[n]ot consume alcohol and/or any other mood altering
substance unless prescribed by a physician.” (R., pp.122-123.) On July 21,
2014 – the day Santana’s residence was searched – there were two articulable
(and stipulated) facts for the probation officer to rely upon to form reasonable
suspicion that Santana was in violation of his probation: (1) on July 7, 2014, he
admitted he had used alcohol and marijuana on or about July 4, 2014, and (2) he
tested positive for marijuana on July 9, 2014. (R., p.125.) These two facts
provided reasonable suspicion that evidence of a probation violation would be
found at Santana’s home.
As noted previously (see n.1, supra), the magistrate court determined that,
regardless of whether there was a reasonable suspicion that Santana was in
violation of his probation, the information providing such suspicion was stale by
the time the search was conducted – 12 days after Santana tested positive for
marijuana.

(6/18/15 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.5.)

The magistrate court’s

“staleness” determination lacks merit. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that
there is no magic number of days before information becomes stale. State v.
Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 808, 623 P.2d 110, 116 (1980). “The question must be
resolved in light of the circumstances of each case.” Id. Additionally, if the
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suspected illegal activity is “of a protracted or continuous nature, a time delay in
the sequence of events is of less significance.” Id. In this case, the probation
violations that were suspected involved drug use, which can be characterized as
a crime of a protracted nature. See State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 24, 56
P.3d 780, 786 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that “[c]ertain nefarious activities, such as
narcotics trafficking, are continuing in nature and, as a result, are less likely to
become stale even over an extended period of time.”). Additionally, the search
occurred only 12 days from the time Santana tested positive for having marijuana
in his system. It was reasonable to suspect that Santana’s residence would
contain not only marijuana, but also any non-disposable paraphernalia (such as a
pipe or bong) used to ingest marijuana on or about July 4, 2014.
Based on these facts, the information known to the probation officers was
not too stale to establish reasonable suspicion and, thus, they had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to search Santana’s home.

CONCLUSION
The state requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order affirming
the magistrate court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remand for
further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of August, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney_______________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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